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  ABSTRACT: This paper concentrates on the key features of corporate governance 
models; first, it highlights the correlation between corporate governance and the economic 
welfare; secondly it sets forth the characteristics of the models at the country level. The focus is 
placed on the correlations between the key elements that are intrinsic to the governance 
evolution in time. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
  Sustainable economic growth is highly supported by innovative technology as 
well as by social and institutional development. At the worldwide level, in the context 
of the natural resources rarity and informational technology development, economic 
performances of different countries are highly interdependent.  
  An actual key-concept is represented by corporate governance. Stricto sensu, 
corporate governance encompasses a system of elements based on which a company is 
managed and controlled. In a market based economy, where a key role is played by 
investment process, corporate governance is represented by the assembly of economic, 
legislative and institutional elements which protect investors’ interests.  
  From a wider perspective, corporate governance represents an assembly of 
policies and control mechanisms that are applied in order to protect and to harmonize 
various interests, frequently contradictory, of different entities acting within a 
company. 
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  Beginning with ’80, a deep focus has been oriented towards corporate 
governance area. This aspect can be explained by Anglo-American codes of good 
corporate governance, like the Cadbury Code (1992) in UK and the Principles and 
Recommendations of the American Law Institute (1984) and the Treadway 
Commission (1987) in the USA. These determined other countries to consider the 
possibility to implement different version of these codes adapted to their national 
systems.  
  In parallel, international organisations such as OECD and the World Bank set 
forth own standards on corporate governance, including corresponding 
recommendations and principles.  
  Other entities deeply involved in the phenomenon such as corporate managers 
or financial managers were at the core of these actions.  
Another key element that generated the development of the corporate governance 
standards was represented by the obligation for the companies that are listed on the 
stock exchanges to implement the corporate governance standards.    
 
2. HETEROGENEITY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MODELS 
 
  The diversity of the corporate governance codes reflects the peculiarities at the 
country level. Literature contains several discussions regarding the impact of the 
financial globalization on the corporate governance models, especially from the 
perspective of a potential alignment of corporate governance systems to identical 
standards. The hypothesis of an unique corporate governance model generated many 
controversial discussions on the model at the country level that would represent the 
reference pillar in accordance with which there will be elaborated the single model.     
  The polemic on a single corporate governance model triggered numerous pros 
and cons, being unlikely to reach a certain compromise.    
  The pros generally rally upon the idea that harmonized policies in terms of 
employment, production and marketing give incentive to a highly competitive 
environment.    
  The cons assume the impossibility to align different corporate governance 
because of intrinsic diverse features originating in different legal systems, financial 
markets or social environments.  
  Academic literature on this topic pointed out that in some countries managers 
proved to protect primarily investors’ interests (USA, UK) while in other countries the 
focus was oriented towards stakeholder’s interests (Japan).   
  Recently, theories regarding corporate governance rallied upon control 
mechanisms that are specific to the shareholders and managers relationships; the 
control becomes effective at the level of the tripartite relationship between institutional 
and private investor-creditor-manager as well. From a theoretical perspective, these 
relationships ground on divergent objectives. Classic theories acknowledge that 
shareholders aim at company value maximization while private investors look for 
profit maximization.  
  In opposition, institutional investors focus on the social dimension, deeply 
anchored in corporate social responsibility area.  
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  Despite the so-called objectives divergence, explained by different interests 
incurred by various entities, analysts confirmed that a common goal support the 
relationships characteristic to corporate governance area: profit increase. 
  This common objective lies behind different corporate management strategies; 
although there are different manners by which these strategies are elaborated, the 
common goal determines an alignment of interest. In line with this idea, the agency 
costs tend to reduce this asymmetry, revealing the importance of the control 
mechanisms that in essence aim at ensuring all the parties involved in a business that 
rules are complied with and all the actions and measures that are taken subscribe to 
wealth accumulation.  
  There are several discussions on the management and corporate governance 
activities; some analysts consider them to interfere to a large extent, but the majority of 
the opinions assume the clear differences between them.  
  Management refers strictly to coordination, organisation and internal control 
activities, being deeply anchored in the internal environment of the company. 
  Corporate governance is rooted especially in external environment, referring to 
the control exerted by shareholders on the company managers.  
  The two types of control –internal and external- are exerted on different layers, 
triggering the involvement of third entities represented by the capital market or 
banking industry; the involvement of these entities is triggered by the necessity to 
make financing operations. 
  The first main challenge in terms of corporate governance analysis is 
represented exactly by the necessity to define corporate governance systems.  
  There are two approaches as for corporate system definition: 
  a narrow one, referring strictly to the relationships between managers 
and board of directors and especially to the manner in which this 
relationship is structured. This type of definition is frequently 
encountered in the o corporate governance codes and the OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance, issued in 2004. 
   a broader one, grounding on the relationship between shareholders 
and mangers. This broader definition is related to a larger extent to the 
internal environment of the company, reflecting the involvement of the 
institutional investors and of the financial markets in the current life of 
the enterprise.  
  The difficulty to capture the characteristics of the corporate governance into a 
strict definition is determined by its complexity.  
  Out of the control mechanism dimension, corporate governance area can be 
associated with the process of wealth creation and distribution (Klein, 2002, pp.375-
400). 
  There are various classifications of corporate governance systems, taking into 
account the country, company or social level peculiarities.  Nevertheless, literature 
contains many variations on two basic models: on one hand the liberal model and on 
the other hand the social model. 
  The liberal model envisages the company to be the property of shareholders 
while the social model reflects the company under the form of a social community,  
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with multiple entities incurring various interests. These different interests represent the 
rationale for agency theory that includes the perspective of various entities such as 
managers, employees and stakeholders.  
  An extension of the social model allows a classification of the corporate 
governance models at the country level. In Germany, France and Japan, the financial 
markets exert a deep impact on corporate governance models; analysts uncovered that 
important features characteristic to corporate governance models are derived out of the 
effect bearing the mark of the financial market (La Porta, et al., 1999, pp.471-517).
  
  The financial globalization represents a challenge for the multinational 
companies from the perspective of the corporate governance model that have to be 
implemented in the organizational structure at the worldwide level. This process 
implies the necessity to select a benchmark corporate governance model in reference 
with which there will be elaborated the global model.   
 
3. CLASSIFICATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MODELS 
 
  Corporate governance structure relies on the following key actors: 
shareholders, managers, employees, suppliers and creditors that interact in a different 
manner within three various corporate governance systems: traditional model, co-
determination model and stakeholder model.   
 Traditional  model  (North-American model) bases on two legal relationships 
and three levels: one is established between shareholders and board by the virtue of an 
agency contract while the other one is established between board and managers. In the 
latter, managers dispose of a form of authority that derives from the board authority. 
This model is assimilated with shareholders’ revenues maximization model; the overall 
firm risk is concentrated on the capital provider who ultimately asks for residual 
revenues.  
  Shareholders select company’s Board of Directors; possessing a share is 
equivalent with a vote right and the Board of Directors selects the management which 
is assumed to make the proper decisions in order to maximize the shares’ value. In this 
case, shares value is based on the present value of future dividends which derive out of 
the net profit.  
 In  the  co-determination model (West European countries model) there are 
three legal relationships and four hierarchization levels; one is established between 
shareholders, managers and employees’ representatives, another level is established 
between managers and employees’ representatives and the last one becomes effective 
through the relationships between managers and shareholders.   
  In comparison with the traditional one, this model introduces a system of 
participative management, grounding on the assumption that business risk is lower for 
shareholders in comparison with employees because of the impossibility to diversify 
investment portfolio from the perspective of the last ones.  
  As for the relationship between shareholders and board members, it is very 
important to mention that there is a superior council that interposes between; this 
council is composed out of shareholders’ and employers’ representatives.  
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The role of the superior council is identical with the role of the shareholders 
from the perspective of certain aspects since it exerts the control function, analyzes the 
startegical objectives of the company and formulates recommendations to the board 
members. 
   In  the  stakeholder model there are two legal reports and four levels: one 
between shareholders and employees representatives, clients, banks, suppliers, state or 
public administration and a report between managers and employees’ representatives 
and the other entities: clients, banks, suppliers, state or public administration. 
  It is forbidden to interpose another entity between shareholders and managers.  
  The rationale of this model consists of the necessity that the activity of a 
company should not be affected by the relationships that are created between entities 
that incur different risks and interests.  
  In comparison with the co-determination model, this model extends the system 
of participative management, although it doers not reflect in a sufficient manner the 
wrights and the obligations of every person in the balance that has to be kept from the 
perspective of the decision making process. The decision making process has as main 
objective to increase the revenues of the company and to enforce its financial position, 
rendering difficult the management control by shareholders since the principle of ,,one 
share – equals one vote” does not perform.   
 
3.1. The single-tier model of corporate governance in the UK  
 
  In UK, corporate governance relies upon the one-tier model that implies a deep 
control exerted by the board of directors on the global activity of the company; the 
current management responsibilities are delegated to some of the executive directors. 
An interesting aspect consists of the fat that executive directors are partly involved in 
the board.  
  The UK model envisages the shareholders to be the unique owners of the 
company. In 1985 there has been adopted the Companies Act as a reform measure that 
asked for considering the employees interests as well, not only the shareholders’. 
Nevertheless, the act did not manage to trigger any enforceability of a potential 
involvement of the employees to participate in the management structure of the 
company or in the oversight of the board activity.  
  Literature reflecting the evolution of the corporate governance theories 
revealed that even during this period of time the role of the managers was represented 
by the administration of the company in the best interests of the stakeholders.    
  Another interesting element consists of the fact that UK is the first UE country 
that initiated important measures regarding the elaboration of precise corporate 
governance standards. Consequently, in 1992 the Cadbury Committee elaborated the 
Cadbury Code of Corporate Governance under the protection of the London Stock 
Exchange and the Order of Financial Auditors. 
  The Cadbury Code represents an important step in the evolution of corporate 
governance systems; its main peculiarity derives from the obligation imposed to the 
companies that are listed on the London Stock Exchange to obey to the rule of comply-
or-explain principle.   
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  Another step in the evolution of the corporate governance system is the report 
published by Greenbury Committee, together with a code attached including principles 
on the disclosure relative to director remuneration; shortly, this aspect became 
compulsory for the companies listed on the Stock Exchange.  
  Even if the specialists made efforts in order to elaborate different standards 
governing the issues of corporate governance, there was a problematic aspect regarding 
the high degree of complexity and even bureaucracy relative to these standards. 
  That is why in January 1998, the Hampel Committee Report made a research 
on the implementation of the Cadbury guidelines and revealed some deficiencies 
caused evenly by their bureaucracy. This is the reason that lies behind a modified 
version of a Combined Code dating from 1998; this version represents in fact a 
synthesis of the former codes that diminishes the bureaucracy degree.  
  Another reference point in the evolution of corporate governance model is the 
Turnbull Report focused on the internal control mechanism.  
  In January 2003 the Higgs Report highlighted the role and effectiveness of 
non-executive directors in the context of the financial scandals occurring that time in 
USA.  
  An important point consists of the persistency of this Combined Code until 
present; nevertheless, there were slight changes made in 2006 and 2008.  
  UK preoccupation for the development of appropriate corporate governance 
standards continued until the present period; this deep interest is supported by 
numerous associations in this area such as Association of British Insurers, National 
Association of Pension Funds and the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England 
and Wales (ICAEW). These legal entities elaborated their own policies in the field of 
corporate governance, many of them containing more strict requirements than those 
that are promoted in the Combined Code.  
  Literature unveiled that the UK corporate governance code, together with other 
European countries codes, concentrated on the necessity to obey managers to 
disciplinary actions so that they should not be capable of tailoring the company 
strategy to their own interest.  
  A lot of studies revealed that managers do not have to be the object of such 
measures as long as their activity envisaged competitive products and services. 
Analysts disclosed that this aspect can be figured out as a compromise solution that 
could solve out a potential conflict between the interests incurred by different entities. 
If the managers are preoccupied by competitive products and services, then the 
economic growth and implicitly the profit accumulation were ensured. This superior 
level of the quality created the opportunity of a competitive advantage in relation with 
the other companies in the market. 
  In fact, the essential objective of corporate governance code consists of the 
process of value creation. Principles underlying corporate governance code aim at 
creating all the premises in order to give incentive to value creation. Academic studies 
disclosed that this process is highly dependent on a key management competency 
consisting of the managers’ capacity to create an adequate work environment, 
characterized by a strong team spirit, in compliance with sound governance principles 
(Lins, 2007, pp.3-51).    
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  Previous researches pointed out that the working climate is highly supportive 
to the value creation process; an important element of this working climate is exactly 
the capacity of managers to avoid the conflicts at the internal and external level.  
  Internally, conflicts may intervene between managers and employees while 
external conflicts are likely to appear between managers, board representatives and 
shareholders. 
  Enron scandal and Madoff fraud revealed that managers’ delinquent actions 
are at the root of the company collapse. From this perspective, corporate governance 
system contributes to sustainable corporate growth. 
          
3.2. The interpretation of the market model for corporate governance in the U.S. 
 
  The US corporate governance model assumes that company managers make 
efforts in order to increase the profit. The strategies they conceive in order to obtain 
benefits consist either of involvement in risky actions, commensurate with the 
company risk profile. A key element of the US corporate governance model consists of 
the limited responsibilities held by lower-level managers. 
  Jensen (1986) elaborated on the free cash-flow theory, suggesting that 
managers are reluctant to dividend distribution to shareholders, preferring rather to 
implement less profitable investment projects; this attitude can be explained by their 
willingness to exert control on the company financial resources.  
  The agency theory gave incentive to further reflections on corporate 
governance, leading to the idea of managers’ motivations by the intermediary of capital 
they posses.  
  Literature revealed that if managers hold a certain percentage of the enterprise 
capital, they are more motivated to implement business strategies in compliance with 
company sustainable growth perspectives (Dahya, et al., 2002, pp.461–483). 
  Analysts showed that business strategies look usually for company value 
maximization; what is really important for company sound governance system consists 
precisely of the manner in which this objective pursued. Only sound practices that are 
in line with a sustainable long term growth ensure an adequate corporate governance 
system (Drobetz, et al., 2004, pp.267-293).  
  The US corporate governance model highlights that shareholders confer to the 
managers the power to make decisions; this is made in respect of the agency costs.  
Researches at the level of US companies (Hermalin, 2004, pp.2351–2384) unveiled 
two key features of US corporate governance system: 
  a high degree of dispersion among shareholders;  
  moreover, a high percentage of company shareholders holds a low level of 
company capital. 
  These two key components reveal the unwillingness of company shareholders 
to bear the agency costs implied by the management oversight. Smith & Warner (1979) 
identified four sources of conflict between shareholders and creditors: the policy of 
dividend distribution, the risk of debt dilution, asset substitution and underinvestment. 
  Another important entity enclosed in the US corporate governance model is 
represented by the company’ creditors.  
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  Financial resources impact company overall business, especially from the 
perspective of financial costs involved by external financing. 
  Credit granting is highly dependent on the company financial standing that is 
precisely subject to the financial analysis performed by the bank officers. 
  Literature unveiled that financial analysis, made prior to credit granting, may 
not reflect the main problematic aspects implied by the company activity (Franks & 
Mayer, 2001, pp.943-77). It is possible that credit may be extended to a company 
which do not fulfil the bank requirements in terms of solvency. This is likely to occur 
because of unreliable financial data reflected in the financial documents. 
  This aspect can lead to moral hazard phenomenon since creditors may be 
exposed to additional risks that are not captured by financial documents. Moreover, 
academic studies uncovered that there are frequent cases when, in a first stage, a 
company meets the solvency conditions imposed by the bank credit strategies, but it is 
possible for the company managers to behave subsequently in a manner that is non-
compliant with sound corporate governance standards (Wymeersch, 2006, pp.1-14). 
  A fundamental aspect of US corporate governance model consists of its focus 
on shareholders’ interests and on financial markets. 
  Literature revealed that a good part of the company financial revenues origin in 
investments in the capital market; this aspect was encouraged by the strong growth 
recorded on the financial market during the period of 2002-2007 (Pérez, 2009, pp.78-
80). Moreover, financial markets offered the opportunity of retirement plans which 
were strongly promoted during the last periods. 
  The orientation of USA corporate governance model towards the financial 
markets can be explained also by the households’ propensity to buy debt securities 
issued by corporations. From this perspective, this type of corporate governance model 
brings forth collateral entities such as pension funds, commercial and investment 
bankers, financial analysts and brokers of an essential importance for the structure of 
corporate governance model. 
  The sustained level of corporate growth recorded in USA gave incentive to 
other countries to implement a similar shareholder oriented corporate governance 
model. Experience showed that the implementation of such a model is not effective 
because of the financial market development degree. Only in the countries that posses a 
developed capital market this model can perform to the utmost effects.  
  The G8 countries made public their decisions to adopt effectively this market 
oriented corporate governance model. Precise strategies have been designed to this 
purpose and effective progresses have been remarked in this respect. Nevertheless, 
corporate governance models are still evolving, especially under the impact of recent 
financial turbulences. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
  Presented in detail modern theories on corporate governance in the light of 
control mechanisms that are specific to the shareholders and managers relationships; 
the control becomes effective at the level of the tripartite relationship between  
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institutional and private investor-creditor-manager as well. From a theoretical 
perspective, these relationships ground on divergent objectives.  
  The approach highlighted classic theories according to which shareholders aim 
at company value maximization while private investors look for profit maximization. 
In opposition, institutional investors focus on the social dimension, deeply anchored in 
corporate social responsibility area. 
  Despite the so-called objectives divergence, explained by different interests 
incurred by various entities, research revealed that a common goal support the 
relationships characteristic to corporate governance area: profit increase. 
  This common objective lies behind different corporate management strategies; 
although there are different manners by which these strategies are elaborated, the 
common goal determines an alignment of interest. In line with this idea, the agency 
costs tend to reduce this asymmetry, revealing the importance of the control 
mechanisms that in essence aim at ensuring all the parties involved in a business that 
rules are complied with and all the actions and measures that are taken subscribe to 
wealth accumulation. 
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